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Mongolia vs. North Korea

Economy

MongoliaNorth Korea
Economy - overview

Foreign direct investment in Mongolia's extractive industries - which are based on extensive deposits of copper, gold, coal, molybdenum, fluorspar, uranium, tin, and tungsten - has transformed Mongolia's landlocked economy from its traditional dependence on herding and agriculture. Exports now account for more than 40% of GDP. Mongolia depends on China for more than 60% of its external trade - China receives some 90% of Mongolia's exports and supplies Mongolia with more than one-third of its imports. Mongolia also relies on Russia for 90% of its energy supplies, leaving it vulnerable to price increases. Remittances from Mongolians working abroad, particularly in South Korea, are significant.

Soviet assistance, at its height one-third of GDP, disappeared almost overnight in 1990 and 1991 at the time of the dismantlement of the USSR. The following decade saw Mongolia endure both deep recession, because of political inaction, and natural disasters, as well as strong economic growth, because of market reforms and extensive privatization of the formerly state-run economy. The country opened a fledgling stock exchange in 1991. Mongolia joined the WTO in 1997 and seeks to expand its participation in regional economic and trade regimes.

Growth averaged nearly 9% per year in 2004-08 largely because of high copper prices globally and new gold production. By late 2008, Mongolia was hit by the global financial crisis and Mongolia's real economy contracted 1.3% in 2009. In early 2009, the IMF reached a $236 million Stand-by Arrangement with Mongolia and it emerged from the crisis with a stronger banking sector and better fiscal management. In October 2009, Mongolia passed long-awaited legislation on an investment agreement to develop the Oyu Tolgoi (OT) mine, among the world's largest untapped copper-gold deposits. However, a dispute with foreign investors developing OT called into question the attractiveness of Mongolia as a destination for foreign investment. This caused a severe drop in FDI, and a slowing economy, leading to the dismissal of Prime Minister Norovyn ALTANKHUYAG in November 2014. The economy had grown more than 10% per year between 2011 and 2013 - largely on the strength of commodity exports and high government spending - before slowing to 7.8% in 2014, and falling to the 2% level in 2015. Growth rebounded from a brief 1.6% contraction in the third quarter of 2016 to 5.8% during the first three quarters of 2017, largely due to rising commodity prices.

The May 2015 agreement with Rio Tinto to restart the OT mine and the subsequent $4.4 billion finance package signing in December 2015 stemmed the loss of investor confidence. The current government has made restoring investor trust and reviving the economy its top priority, but has failed to invigorate the economy in the face of the large drop-off in foreign direct investment, mounting external debt, and a sizeable budget deficit. Mongolia secured a $5.5 billion financial assistance package from the IMF and a host of international creditors in May 2017, which is expected to improve Mongolia's long-term fiscal and economic stability as long as Ulaanbaatar can advance the agreement's difficult contingent reforms, such as consolidating the government's off-balance sheet liabilities and rehabilitating the Mongolian banking sector.

North Korea, one of the world's most centrally directed and least open economies, faces chronic economic problems. Industrial capital stock is nearly beyond repair as a result of decades of mismanagement, underinvestment, shortages of spare parts, and poor maintenance. Corruption and resource misallocation, including show projects, large-scale military spending, and development of its ballistic missile and nuclear programs, severely draws off resources needed for investment and civilian consumption. Industrial and power outputs have stagnated for years at a fraction of pre-1990 levels. Frequent weather-related crop failures aggravated chronic food shortages caused by on-going systemic problems, including a lack of arable land, collective farming practices, poor soil quality, insufficient fertilization, and persistent shortages of tractors and fuel.

 

The mid 1990s through mid-2000s were marked by severe famine and widespread starvation. Significant food aid was provided by the international community through 2009. Since that time, food assistance has declined significantly. In the last few years, domestic corn and rice production has improved, although domestic production does not fully satisfy demand. A large portion of the population continues to suffer from prolonged malnutrition and poor living conditions. Since 2002, the government has allowed semi-private markets to begin selling a wider range of goods, allowing North Koreans to partially make up for diminished public distribution system rations. It also implemented changes in the management process of communal farms in an effort to boost agricultural output.

 

In December 2009, North Korea carried out a redenomination of its currency, capping the amount of North Korean won that could be exchanged for the new notes, and limiting the exchange to a one-week window. A concurrent crackdown on markets and foreign currency use yielded severe shortages and inflation, forcing Pyongyang to ease the restrictions by February 2010. In response to the sinking of the South Korean warship Cheonan and the shelling of Yeonpyeong Island in 2010, South Korea's government cut off most aid, trade, and bilateral cooperation activities. In February 2016, South Korea ceased its remaining bilateral economic activity by closing the Kaesong Industrial Complex in response to North Korea's fourth nuclear test a month earlier. This nuclear test and another in September 2016 resulted in two United Nations Security Council Resolutions that targeted North Korea's foreign currency earnings, particularly coal and other mineral exports. Throughout 2017, North Korea's continued nuclear and missile tests led to a tightening of UN sanctions, resulting in full sectoral bans on DPRK exports and drastically limited key imports. Over the last decade, China has been North Korea's primary trading partner.

 

The North Korean Government continues to stress its goal of improving the overall standard of living, but has taken few steps to make that goal a reality for its populace. In 2016, the regime used two mass mobilizations - one totaling 70 days and another 200 days - to spur the population to increase production and complete construction projects quickly. The regime released a five-year economic development strategy in May 2016 that outlined plans for promoting growth across sectors. Firm political control remains the government's overriding concern, which likely will inhibit formal changes to North Korea's current economic system.

GDP (purchasing power parity)$39.723 billion (2019 est.)

$37.774 billion (2018 est.)

$35.222 billion (2017 est.)

note: data are in 2017 dollars
$40 billion (2015 est.)

$40 billion (2014 est.)

$40 billion (2013 est.)

note: data are in 2015 US dollars
North Korea does not publish reliable National Income Accounts data; the data shown are derived from purchasing power parity (PPP) GDP estimates that were made by Angus MADDISON in a study conducted for the OECD; his figure for 1999 was extrapolated to 2015 using estimated real growth rates for North Korea's GDP and an inflation factor based on the US GDP deflator; the results were rounded to the nearest $10 billion.
GDP - real growth rate5.1% (2017 est.)

1.2% (2016 est.)

2.4% (2015 est.)
-1.1% (2015 est.)

1% (2014 est.)

1.1% (2013 est.)
GDP - per capita (PPP)$12,317 (2019 est.)

$11,916 (2018 est.)

$11,312 (2017 est.)

note: data are in 2017 dollars
$1,700 (2015 est.)

$1,800 (2014 est.)

$1,800 (2013 est.)

note: data are in 2015 US dollars
GDP - composition by sectoragriculture: 12.1% (2017 est.)

industry: 38.2% (2017 est.)

services: 49.7% (2017 est.)
agriculture: 22.5% (2017 est.)

industry: 47.6% (2017 est.)

services: 29.9% (2017 est.)
Population below poverty line28.4% (2018 est.)NA
Household income or consumption by percentage sharelowest 10%: 13.7%

highest 10%: 5.7% (2017)
lowest 10%: NA

highest 10%: NA
Inflation rate (consumer prices)4.6% (2017 est.)

0.5% (2016 est.)

NA

Labor force1.241 million (2017 est.)14 million (2014 est.)

note: estimates vary widely
Labor force - by occupationagriculture: 31.1%

industry: 18.5%

services: 50.5% (2016)
agriculture: 37%

industry: 63% (2008 est.)
Unemployment rate8% (2017 est.)

7.9% (2016 est.)
25.6% (2013 est.)

25.5% (2012 est.)
Budgetrevenues: 2.967 billion (2017 est.)

expenditures: 3.681 billion (2017 est.)
revenues: 3.2 billion (2007 est.)

expenditures: 3.3 billion (2007 est.)
Industriesconstruction and construction materials; mining (coal, copper, molybdenum, fluorspar, tin, tungsten, gold); oil; food and beverages; processing of animal products, cashmere and natural fiber manufacturingmilitary products; machine building, electric power, chemicals; mining (coal, iron ore, limestone, magnesite, graphite, copper, zinc, lead, and precious metals), metallurgy; textiles, food processing; tourism
Industrial production growth rate-1% (2017 est.)1% (2017 est.)
Agriculture - productsmilk, wheat, goat milk, potatoes, mutton, sheep milk, beef, goat meat, horse meat, carrots/turnipsrice, maize, vegetables, apples, potatoes, cabbages, fruit, sweet potatoes, beans, soybeans
Exports$7.012 billion (2018)

$5.834 billion (2017 est.)

$4.916 billion (2016 est.)
$222 million (2018)

$4.582 billion (2017 est.)

$2.908 billion (2015 est.)
Exports - commoditiescoal, copper, gold, iron, crude petroleum (2019)watch components, fake hair, iron alloys, instructional models, tungsten (2019)
Exports - partnersChina 81%, Switzerland 9% (2019)China 67%, Suriname 6% (2019)
Imports$5.875 billion (2018)

$4.345 billion (2017 est.)

$3.466 billion (2016 est.)
$2.32 billion (2018 est.)

$3.86 billion (2016 est.)
Imports - commoditiesrefined petroleum, cars, delivery trucks, construction vehicles, aircraft (2019)clothing and apparel, soybean oil, rice, wheat products, clocks/watches (2019)
Imports - partnersChina 31%, Russia 29%, Japan 10%, South Korea 5% (2019)China 96% (2019)
Debt - external$29.945 billion (2019 est.)

$28.046 billion (2018 est.)
$5 billion (2013 est.)
Exchange ratestogrog/tugriks (MNT) per US dollar -

2,378.1 (2017 est.)

2,140.3 (2016 est.)

2,140.3 (2015 est.)

1,970.3 (2014 est.)

1,817.9 (2013 est.)
North Korean won (KPW) per US dollar (average market rate)

135 (2017 est.)

130 (2016 est.)

130 (2015 est.)

98.5 (2013 est.)

155.5 (2012 est.)
Fiscal yearcalendar yearcalendar year
GDP (official exchange rate)$11.14 billion (2017 est.)$28 billion (2013 est.)
Taxes and other revenues26.6% (of GDP) (2017 est.)11.4% (of GDP) (2007 est.)

note: excludes earnings from state-operated enterprises
Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)-6.4% (of GDP) (2017 est.)-0.4% (of GDP) (2007 est.)
GDP - composition, by end usehousehold consumption: 49.2% (2017 est.)

government consumption: 12.3% (2017 est.)

investment in fixed capital: 23.8% (2017 est.)

investment in inventories: 12.4% (2017 est.)

exports of goods and services: 59.5% (2017 est.)

imports of goods and services: -57.1% (2017 est.)
household consumption: NA (2014 est.)

government consumption: NA (2014 est.)

investment in fixed capital: NA (2014 est.)

investment in inventories: NA (2014 est.)

exports of goods and services: 5.9% (2016 est.)

imports of goods and services: -11.1% (2016 est.)
Gross national saving23.7% of GDP (2019 est.)

26% of GDP (2018 est.)

21.2% of GDP (2017 est.)

NA

Source: CIA Factbook