Moldova vs. Romania

A large portion of present day Moldovan territory became a province of the Russian Empire in 1812 and then unified with Romania in 1918 in the aftermath of World War I. This territory was then incorporated into the Soviet Union at the close of World War II. Although Moldova has been independent from the Soviet Union since 1991, Russian forces have remained on Moldovan territory east of the Nistru River in the breakaway region of Transnistria, whose population is roughly equally composed of ethnic Ukrainians, Russians, and Moldovans.

Years of Communist Party rule in Moldova from 2001-2009 ultimately ended with election-related violent protests and a rerun of parliamentary elections in 2009. Since then, a series of pro-European ruling coalitions have governed Moldova. As a result of the country's most recent legislative election in February 2019, parliamentary seats are split among the left-leaning Socialist Party (35 seats), the former ruling Democratic Party (30 seats), and the center-right ACUM bloc (26 seats). Parliament voted in Prime Minister Ion CHICU and his cabinet on 14 November 2019, two days after voting to remove his predecessor, ACUM co-leader Maia SANDU, who had been in office since June 2019.

32 raions (raioane, singular - raion), 3 municipalities (municipii, singular - municipiul), 1 autonomous territorial unit (unitatea teritoriala autonoma), and 1 territorial unit (unitatea teritoriala)

raions: Anenii Noi, Basarabeasca, Briceni, Cahul, Cantemir, Calarasi, Causeni, Cimislia, Criuleni, Donduseni, Drochia, Dubasari, Edinet, Falesti, Floresti, Glodeni, Hincesti, Ialoveni, Leova, Nisporeni, Ocnita, Orhei, Rezina, Riscani, Singerei, Soldanesti, Soroca, Stefan Voda, Straseni, Taraclia, Telenesti, Ungheni

municipalities: Balti, Bender, Chisinau

autonomous territorial unit: Gagauzia

territorial unit: Stinga Nistrului (Transnistria)

last held on 11 July 2021 (next scheduled for July 2025)

percent of vote by party - PAS 52.8%, BECS (PSRM+PCRM) 27.1%, SOR 5.7%; seats by party - PAS 63, BECS 32, SOR 6

represented in Parliament:
Action and Solidarity Party or PAS [Maia SANDU]
Electoral Bloc of Communists and Socialists or BECS [Vladimir VORONIN] (a coalition of PSRM and PCRM)
Shor Party or PS [Ilan SHOR]
not represented in Parliament, participated in recent elections (2014-2021):
Anti-Mafia Movement or MPA [Sergiu MOCANU]
Centrist Union of Moldova or UCM [Mihai PETRACHE]
Christian Democratic People's Party or PPCD [Victor CIOBANU]
Communist Party of the Republic of Moldova or PCRM [Vladimir VORONIN]
Conservative Party or PC [Natalia NIRCA]
Democratic Party of Moldova or PDM [Vladimir PLAHOTNIUC]
Democracy at Home Party or PDA [Vasile COSTIUC]
Democratic Action Party or PAD [Mihai GODEA]
Dignity and Truth Platform or PPDA [Andrei NASTASE]
Ecologist Green Party or PVE [Anatolie PROHNITCHI]
European People's Party of Moldova or EPPM [Iurie LEANCA]
Law and Justice Party or PLD [Nicolae ALEXEI]
Liberal Democratic Party of Moldova or PLDM [Tudor DELIU]
Liberal Party or PL [Dorin CHIRTOACA]
"Motherland" Party or PP [Sergiu BIRIUCOV]
National Liberal Party or PNL [Vitalia PAVLICENKO]
NOW Platform or ACUM (PPDA + PAS) [Andre NASTASE + Maia SANDU]
Our Home Moldova or PCNM [Grigore PETRENCO]
Our Party or PN [Renato USATII]
Party of National Unity [Anatol SALARU]
People's Party of Moldova or PPRM [Alexandru OLEINIC]
Regions Party of Moldova or PRM [Alexandr KALININ]
Socialist Party of the Republic of Moldova or PSRM [Zinaida GRECEANII]
Socialist People's Party of Moldova or PPSM [Victor STEPANIUC]

Despite recent progress, Moldova remains one of the poorest countries in Europe. With a moderate climate and productive farmland, Moldova's economy relies heavily on its agriculture sector, featuring fruits, vegetables, wine, wheat, and tobacco. Moldova also depends on annual remittances of about $1.2 billion - almost 15% of GDP - from the roughly one million Moldovans working in Europe, Israel, Russia, and elsewhere.

With few natural energy resources, Moldova imports almost all of its energy supplies from Russia and Ukraine. Moldova's dependence on Russian energy is underscored by a more than $6 billion debt to Russian natural gas supplier Gazprom, largely the result of unreimbursed natural gas consumption in the breakaway region of Transnistria. Moldova and Romania inaugurated the Ungheni-Iasi natural gas interconnector project in August 2014. The 43-kilometer pipeline between Moldova and Romania, allows for both the import and export of natural gas. Several technical and regulatory delays kept gas from flowing into Moldova until March 2015. Romanian gas exports to Moldova are largely symbolic. In 2018, Moldova awarded a tender to Romanian Transgaz to construct a pipeline connecting Ungheni to Chisinau, bringing the gas to Moldovan population centers. Moldova also seeks to connect with the European power grid by 2022.

The government's stated goal of EU integration has resulted in some market-oriented progress. Moldova experienced better than expected economic growth in 2017, largely driven by increased consumption, increased revenue from agricultural exports, and improved tax collection. During fall 2014, Moldova signed an Association Agreement and a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement with the EU (AA/DCFTA), connecting Moldovan products to the world's largest market. The EU AA/DCFTA has contributed to significant growth in Moldova's exports to the EU. In 2017, the EU purchased over 65% of Moldova's exports, a major change from 20 years previously when the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) received over 69% of Moldova's exports. A $1 billion asset-stripping heist of Moldovan banks in late 2014 delivered a significant shock to the economy in 2015; the subsequent bank bailout increased inflationary pressures and contributed to the depreciation of the leu and a minor recession. Moldova's growth has also been hampered by endemic corruption, which limits business growth and deters foreign investment, and Russian restrictions on imports of Moldova's agricultural products. The government's push to restore stability and implement meaningful reform led to the approval in 2016 of a $179 million three-year IMF program focused on improving the banking and fiscal environments, along with additional assistance programs from the EU, World Bank, and Romania. Moldova received two IMF tranches in 2017, totaling over $42.5 million.

Over the longer term, Moldova's economy remains vulnerable to corruption, political uncertainty, weak administrative capacity, vested bureaucratic interests, energy import dependence, Russian political and economic pressure, heavy dependence on agricultural exports, and unresolved separatism in Moldova's Transnistria region.

Romania, which joined the EU on 1 January 2007, began the transition from communism in 1989 with a largely obsolete industrial base and a pattern of output unsuited to the country's needs. Romania's macroeconomic gains have only recently started to spur creation of a middle class and to address Romania's widespread poverty. Corruption and red tape continue to permeate the business environment.

In the aftermath of the global financial crisis, Romania signed a $26 billion emergency assistance package from the IMF, the EU, and other international lenders, but GDP contracted until 2011. In March 2011, Romania and the IMF/EU/World Bank signed a 24-month precautionary standby agreement, worth $6.6 billion, to promote fiscal discipline, encourage progress on structural reforms, and strengthen financial sector stability; no funds were drawn. In September 2013, Romanian authorities and the IMF/EU agreed to a follow-on standby agreement, worth $5.4 billion, to continue with reforms. This agreement expired in September 2015, and no funds were drawn. Progress on structural reforms has been uneven, and the economy still is vulnerable to external shocks.

Economic growth rebounded in the 2013-17 period, driven by strong industrial exports, excellent agricultural harvests, and, more recently, expansionary fiscal policies in 2016-2017 that nearly quadrupled Bucharest's annual fiscal deficit, from +0.8% of GDP in 2015 to -3% of GDP in 2016 and an estimated -3.4% in 2017. Industry outperformed other sectors of the economy in 2017. Exports remained an engine of economic growth, led by trade with the EU, which accounts for roughly 70% of Romania trade. Domestic demand was the major driver, due to tax cuts and large wage increases that began last year and are set to continue in 2018.

An aging population, emigration of skilled labor, significant tax evasion, insufficient health care, and an aggressive loosening of the fiscal package compromise Romania's long-term growth and economic stability and are the economy's top vulnerabilities.

high unemployment and economic pressures have reduced consumer spending in telecom market; endeavors to join the EU have promoted regulatory issues in line with EU standards; mobile market extended outside of cities and across most of the country; LTE services available; market is competitive, fiber accounts for 62% of all fixed broadband connections and most telecom revenue is from the mobile market; importer of broadcasting equipment from China (2021)

Romania's telecom sector benefits from infrastructure-based competition; domestic and international service improving rapidly, especially mobile-cellular services; fiber sector is one of strongest in Europe; government secured EU funding to extend broadband to rural areas; operators invest in networks' capacity upgrades; operator testing IoT; importer of broadcasting equipment from EU neighbors (2021)

Moldova and Ukraine operate joint customs posts to monitor the transit of people and commodities through Moldova's break-away Transnistria region, which remains under the auspices of an Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe-mandated peacekeeping mission comprised of Moldovan, Transnistrian, Russian, and Ukrainian troops

the ICJ ruled largely in favor of Romania in its dispute submitted in 2004 over Ukrainian-administered Zmiyinyy/Serpilor (Snake) Island and Black Sea maritime boundary delimitation; Romania opposes Ukraine's reopening of a navigation canal from the Danube border through Ukraine to the Black Sea